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INTRODUCTION 
In an age where information has become as significant as 
any natural resource, data remains fiercely constrained by 
protectionism. Whether out of genuine, yet misunderstood, 
concerns for privacy and cybersecurity or because of simple, 
unabashed protectionist instincts, countries around the world 
have pursued policies designed to impede cross-border data flows, 
localize data, and stifle digital trade. These digital trade 
barriers—such as, requiring data on citizens of a country to be 
stored in country rather than on overseas servers—increase 
costs, cut against competition (especially for small Internet-based 
businesses), and frustrate innovation. 
As countries continue to erect digital trade barriers, the 
value of the global information flow diminishes. While a recent 
report by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimates 
that the Internet improves the productivity of digitally intense 
industries by 7.8% to 10.9%,1 barriers from the European Union 
(“EU”) to China pose a direct challenge and potential impediment 
to that productivity. Data localization requirements and 
restrictions on cross-border data flows, perhaps more than any 
other digital trade barrier, impede the next generation of 
international trade facilitation—cloud computing. In recent 
years, cloud traffic has increased from 3.5 to 5.6 zettabytes2 and 
will reach 10.4 zettabytes by 2019.3 Cloud computing is 
particularly useful because it “provides portability” and “allows 
for more seamless upgrades and transitions to new or multiple 
devices, because content does not need to be laboriously copied 
from one device to another.”4 
However, the success of cloud computing, and electronic 
commerce at large hinges on a global distribution of servers. 
Lack of servers and enormous distances between them can be the 
cause of lethargic delivery times, which undermines international 
trade.5 Therefore, restrictions on digital trade frustrate the 
 
 * The views expressed herein belong solely to me. I would like to thank Patrick 
Holvey, Al Gidari, Bill Watson, and Carolyn Iodice for their advice and wisdom. 
 1 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC 
Pub. 4485, at 65 (Aug. 2014) (Final). 
 2 A zettabyte is one trillion gigabytes. See Thomas Barnett, Jr., The Zettabyte 
Era Officially Begins (How Much is That?), CISCO BLOG (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://blogs.cisco.com/sp/the-zettabyte-era-officially-begins-how-much-is-that 
[http://perma.cc/X8YT-QFDB]. 
 3 Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin, Exporting Internet Law Through 
International Trade Agreements: Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age, 24 
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH 317, 333 (2016). 
 4 Id. at 334. 
 5 See Steven R. Swanson, Google Set Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and 
International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 715, 741 (2011). 
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distribution of the global network needed to make e-commerce and 
Internet-enabled international trade successful. Since it would be 
difficult for a state to block access to individual users, 
governments instead seek to control the flow of data higher up 
the chain, usually at the level of certain intermediaries like 
Internet Service Providers.6 While reducing these barriers is a 
useful and necessary tool towards protecting free Internet-
enabled commerce, it is also a traditional solution.  
This article proposes an unconventional solution to the 
problem of digital trade restrictions: digital trade zones. Digital 
trade zones would be areas in which a country would forbear 
from jurisdiction over certain Internet and privacy laws in order 
to permit innovative arrangements between countries as a means 
of circumventing otherwise impeding digital trade restrictions. 
To date there has not been any discussion of creating special 
jurisdictions for the trade and treatment of data.7 
This article lays a foundation for such a discussion. Part I 
highlights the key impediments to digital trade. Part II discusses 
the theoretical foundation of digital trade zones, analogizing this 
framework to both maritime law and Foreign Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”) in the United States, each a key ingredient needed to 
make digital trade zones function. Part III anticipates successes 
and problems posed by digital trade zones in practice by 
presenting some of the potential mechanics of digital trade zones 
in the United States. Specifically, it proposes two types of 
zones—experimental zones and waystation zones—addressing, 
respectively, the impediments created by restrictions on cross-
border data flows and data localization. Part III also contains a 
discussion of the ways in which digital trade zones offer answers 
to some common intellectual property rights violations frequently 
encountered in the course of trade. The Conclusion summarizes 
the work and proposes next steps to further the discussion. 
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO DIGITAL TRADE 
From galleons to gigabytes, international trade has come a 
long way.8 Producers and consumers can be instantaneously 
connected, and the flow of information across the globe has 
facilitated a commercial revolution. While the world is more 
 
 6 See id. at 719. 
 7 A single article does discuss treating the emerging internet ecosystem broadly as a 
single “digital free trade zone.” See Kristi L. Bergemann, A Digital Free Trade Zone and 
Necessarily-Regulated Self-Governance for Electronic Commerce: The World Trade 
Organization, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20 JOHN 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595, 629 (2002). 
 8 From pieces of eight to 8-bit also hits the tone I am going for. 
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connected than ever, barriers to digital trade are being erected at 
an alarming pace. Despite the myriad of challenges facing 
individuals and industry engaging in e-commerce, three of the 
most common digital trade restrictions are data localization, 
restrictions on cross-border data flows, and intellectual property 
rights infringement.9 
A. Data Localization 
Data localization refers to mandates that require companies 
to engage in digital trade-related activities inside of the 
particular country in order to do business in that country.10 
Sometimes called “data nationalism,” data localization is an 
extreme attempt by a government to restrict the flow of data 
from escaping beyond its control and its borders. Data 
localization can be contrasted with historical Internet border 
controls; while previous controls were mainly designed to keep 
information from entering a country, localization efforts build on 
this by preventing data from leaving.11 
The most common localization efforts require that data 
storage facilities house data in the country or jurisdiction that 
originates the data.12 For example, in 2015, Russia required that 
data collected by companies on Russian citizens be both 
processed and stored within Russia.13 While there is still 
uncertainty about how the law will be implemented, the outlook 
for such localization requirements is not good. This is because 
Russia currently lacks the server capacity to shoulder the 
demand for data storage as required by the law.14 
China also has localization restrictions aimed at cloud 
computing. Given its geographic agnosticism, cloud computing is 
frequently an unfortunate first casualty of data localization. In 
China, cloud computing is closed to foreign-invested companies 
and the country is presently seeking to limit foreign companies 
from offering cloud computing services if they are cross-border 
 
 9 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT 
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2017) [hereinafter NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT] 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/NTE/2017%20NTE.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YL6U-DT56]. 
 10 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, Inv. No. 332-531, USITC 
Pub. 4415 (July 2013) (Final). 
 11 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 
679 (2015). 
 12 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, KEY BARRIERS TO DIGITAL TRADE 
(Mar. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/march/key- 
barriers-digital-trade [http://perma.cc/BWV4-VU7A]. 
 13 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 382. 
 14 Id. 
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services.15 But localization is not limited to tyrannical regimes. 
Even Canada has caught the localization bug. British Columbia 
and Nova Scotia both have laws that require that personal 
information possessed by public institutionssuch as schools, 
universities, or hospitalsmust be stored and accessed only 
in Canada.16 
Localization requirements such as these can be incredibly 
costly to service providers and consumers. Since, at its most 
extreme, localization could require a provider to construct 
physical data infrastructure in every jurisdiction where it does 
business, one can begin to imagine the expense that such 
requirements place on the private sector and the limitations 
they pose for global investment and business expansion. In 
Brazil, for example, a data center costs on average $60.9 
million.17 Even in the United States, construction of a data 
center can exceed $40 million.18 In countries with more 
burdensome regulatory environments, construction costs could 
be even higher. For example, Chinese localization efforts could 
cost as much as 1.1% of the nation’s gross domestic product.19 
B. Cross-Border Data Flow Restrictions 
Less extreme than data localization, restrictions on the flow 
of data across borders encompass a host of activities and 
regulations designed to impede information exchange. By 
limiting what types of data can be exported and how data flow 
restrictions can frustrate a broad range of e-commerce activities, 
banks may be unable to transfer data between international 
branches, and big data analysis may be limited by turning off the 
information spigot to companies that rely on cutting-edge 
marketing strategies.20 Even individuals can be implicated by 
cross-border data flow restrictions. Consider that fifty-eight 
percent of eBay revenue comes from outside the United States 
and that Airbnb operates in more than 65,000 cities and 191 
countries.21 Consumers and companies in the United States are 
 
 15 Id. at 89. 
 16 Id. at 72. 
 17 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the 
Global Internet (Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 378, 2014). 
 18 See id. 
 19 Matthias Bauer et al., The Costs of Data Localisation: Friendly Fire on Economic 
Recovery, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON. 2 (2014). 
 20 See RACHEL G. FEFER, SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. 
RES. SERV., R44565, DIGITAL TRADE AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 13 (2017). 
 21 Craig Smith, 70 Amazing eBay Statistics and Facts, DMR, https://expanded 
ramblings.com/index.php/ebay-stats/ [http://perma.cc/6UME-GT3R] (last updated Feb. 3, 
2018); About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [http://perma.cc/7DHL-67JP] 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
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connecting with international markets in a variety of innovative 
ways; they too can be entrepreneurially constrained by digital 
trade restrictions. 
Restrictions on cross-border data flows are varied. Many are 
already familiar with China’s Great Firewall, which blocks 
websites such as Twitter, Google, and Facebook.22 In a recently 
issued policy, “On Cleaning up and Regulating Internet Access 
Services Market,” China prohibits telecommunications carriers 
from permitting consumers access to virtual private network 
connections to contact data centers abroad.23 The European 
Union is considering proposals on contract rules for digital 
content, such as streaming services and for goods sold online. 
Ostensibly designed to address “defective” content purchased 
online, it remains to be seen how this will limit the ability of U.S. 
providers to conduct digital business in Europe or lead to a 
bifurcation of service into separate geographic zones. These are 
just a handful of the numerous international limitations on data 
flows that threaten the free exchange of information throughout 
the world. 
The numerousness of limits on cross-border data flows make 
the costliness of compliance with such efforts unsurprising. The 
Great Firewall blocks eleven of the top twenty-five global 
websites, and estimates place the total number of blocked sites at 
3000.24 This costs individuals and organizations countless dollars 
a year in lost business. Given the acceleration of cloud 
computing—twenty-two percent of OECD-based businesses25 use 
cloud computing services—limiting the ability of the cloud to 
serve different populations easily is an expensive proposition.26 
Moreover, much of the value that comes from data is increasingly 
made by gleaning insights from data in real time.27 Curtailing 
that real time analysis means placing an upper limit on a core 
part of data’s intrinsic usefulness. Imagine a farmer relying on 
Internet-enabled equipment to plant crops more precisely. If that 
farmer is located in a country which limits his access to the 
cloud, the data he is simultaneously producing as he plants 
cannot be easily transformed from raw to useful information to 
make his activity more precise. Or consider the aircraft 
 
 22 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 90. 
 23 Id. at 89. 
 24 Id. at 90. 
 25 OECD stands for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 26 Expanding U.S. Digital Trade and Eliminating Barriers to Digital Exports: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 
3 (2016) (statement of Robert D. Atkinson, President, Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation) [hereinafter Atkinson Testimony]. 
 27 Id. at 2. 
Do Not Delete 4/24/2018 4:58 PM 
2018] Digital Trade Zones 449 
manufacturing industry. A Boeing 737 engine produces twenty 
terabytes of data per hour.28 Boeing utilizes this enormous 
amount of data to enhance safety and reduce flight delays. 
Boeing’s Airplane Health Management system is used by 
commercial airlines that operate Boeing aircraft in real time to 
assess and mitigate potential aircraft problems.29 Given that 
crossing borders is core to an aircraft’s purpose, the success of 
this entire endeavor is rooted in Boeing’s ability to move 
enormous amounts of data around the globe quickly and 
effortlessly. It is estimated that the Internet of Things, such as 
Boeing’s engines, other industrial machines, and consumer 
electronics, will yield $11.1 trillion per year in economic impact.30 
Data flow limitations cut directly into that figure, threatening 
one of the largest potential additions to economic productivity in 
the coming years. 
C. Intellectual Property Rights Infringement 
Internet-enabled trade has simultaneously created new 
markets for intellectual property rights (“IPR”) and caused a 
great proliferation of IPR infringement. Frequently, Internet 
piracy is named as a key trade barrier, including foreign 
countries hosting websites that post pirated content or connect 
people to such stolen content.31 According to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, who issues lists of countries that are serial IPR 
violators, the countries on the “priority watch list” span the 
globe, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela.32 
Infringement of IPR can take many forms. Often times, 
foreign websites will host pirated or stolen content. For example, 
MP3VA.com is a site based in Russia and Ukraine that sells 
unauthorized U.S. audio recordings.33 The site registers more 
than 860,000 visits per month, with most of the visits coming 
 
 28 See John B. Maggiore, Remote Management of Real-Time Airplane Data, BOEING 
(2007), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_3_07/AERO_Q307_ 
article4.pdf [http://perma.cc/T9BS-GL4Z]; Paul Mathai, Big Data: Catalyzing Performance 
in Manufacturing, WIPRO 3 (2011), https://www.wipro.com/content/dam/nexus/en/industries/ 
process%20and-industrial-manufacturing/latest-thinking/2606-Big%20Data%20-%20Copy.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KXA4-M89Y]. 
 29 Atkinson Testimony, supra note 27, at 6. 
 30 Id. at 3. 
 31 FEFER, AKHTAR & MORRISON, supra note 20, at 16. 
 32 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2017) 
[hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special 
%20301% 20Report%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/LW35-7L6X]. 
 33 Id. 
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from the United States.34 A similar website is uploaded.net, 
which gives users access to different kinds of copyrighted 
content, such as movies, music, and books. Hosted in the 
Netherlands, uploaded.com uses a creative arrangement to make 
money whereby users receive greater compensation for the 
greater size of the file they pirate and load to the website.35 
Another website is taobao.com, an e-commerce platform that sells 
many counterfeit products. Taobao.com is one of the top websites 
in China.36 Another example of IPR infringement is the theft of 
trade secrets. China is a repeat offender on this issue. While 
China has taken steps to address the theft of trade secrets, 
including amendments to the General Provisions of the Civil Law 
in March 2017 that extended civil intellectual property protection 
to trade secrets, there remains a long way to go.37 This includes 
improving options for the use of preliminary injunctions and 
protections against frivolous trade secret litigation claims which 
can be used to gain advantage in unrelated disputes.38 
Given the expansiveness of the Internet and the ease with 
which it facilitates IPR infringement, IPR infringement is 
exceptionally costly. Some estimate that Internet-enabled IPR 
infringement could be greater than the total volume of sales 
“through traditional channels such as street vendors and other 
physical markets.”39 An OECD study places trade in fake goods 
at $461 billion or 2.5% of global trade, and it has been noted that 
“the total magnitude of counterfeiting and piracy worldwide in all 
forms appears to be approaching, if not surpassing, the trillion 
dollar mark.”40 
D. Motivations to Limit Digital Trade 
The motivation to limit digital trade to prevent violations of 
IPR may appear the most straightforward—preventing the raw 
profiteering from the sale of stolen goods. However, when it 
comes to other barriers to digital trade, the motivations are 
somewhat more opaque. Data flow restrictions and associated 
 
 34 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF 
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 9 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Notorious Markets] https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/ files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf [http://perma.cc/LMT2-RZ6K]. 
 35 Id. at 14. 
 36 See id. at 12. 
 37 See SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 32, at 30. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 13. 
 40 OFFICE OF THE INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, U.S. JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT FY 2017–2019, at 20 (2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/2016jointstrategicplan.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U68K-6FUQ].  
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localization requirements have been enacted for a myriad of 
reasons by various countries. 
The most common rationales respond to fears that sharing 
data abroad will open such data up to surveillance by foreign 
governments. This public motivation stems from dual desires to 
protect the privacy of the country’s own citizens and a 
protectionist motivation to stimulate domestic technology and 
Internet companies. In the wake of the Snowden revelations, 
countries, including India and the EU, have pursued various 
efforts to guard against U.S. surveillance.41 Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa (collectively known as the “BRICS 
countries”) have also sought to create a series of global 
transmission cables intended to be “a network free of U.S. 
eavesdropping.”42 From a civil liberties perspective, some have 
commented that centralizing data within certain countries only 
makes it easier for domestic agencies and law enforcement to spy 
on their own citizens by concentrating citizens’ data more 
closely.43 The veracity of claims that localization and data flow 
restrictions are primarily rooted in concern over foreign 
surveillance belongs in a paper all its own, and it is worth noting 
that some have pushed back against this notion by arguing that 
surveillance concerns are a veneer for what is ultimately digital 
protectionism against mostly American companies.44 
Regardless of motivations, these efforts have demonstrated 
protectionist effects. Governments may believe that by limiting 
foreign competition, which is often American competition given the 
United States’ technological and commercial dominance, a 
domestic technology industry may flourish. However, governments 
around the world have worried about the impediments this logic 
poses to the information economy globally. The OECD has asked 
countries to abstain from “barriers to the location, access and use 
of cross-border data facilities and functions” in order to “ensure 
cost effectiveness and other efficiencies.”45 In a survey of domestic 
companies, the Swedish National Board of Trade concluded that 
“trade cannot happen without data being moved from one location 
to another.”46 
 
 41 See Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 10, 28. 
 42 Id. at 28. 
 43 See id. at 30. Chander and Le refer to this as the “Honeypot” problem. Id. 
 44 See Christopher Kuner, Data Nationalism and its Discontents, 64 EMORY L.J. 
ONLINE 2089, 2094–95 (2015). 
 45 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON 
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNET POLICY MAKING 7 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
sti/ieconomy/49258588.pdf [http://perma.cc/BA4E-LLDA].  
 46 The National Board of Trade, No Transfer, No Trade – the Importance of Cross-
Border Data Transfer for Companies Based in Sweden, 1 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM 23 (2014). 
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II. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN THEORY 
Digital trade zones possess two core theoretical 
tenets—freedom from data nationalism and existence as 
jurisdictions legally “outside” the territory of a country. Since 
digital trade zones do not presently exist, examination and 
understanding of these concepts is best done by analogy. The 
first tenet is demonstrated, in its purest form, on the high seas 
where nations are unable to exercise restrictions on the 
movement of Internet information. The second tenet is more real. 
FTZs in the United States offer a well-tested and successful 
framework to understand some of the basic mechanics of digital 
trade zones. 
A. The High Seas 
At their core, digital trade zones (just like all special 
jurisdictions) are areas with unique rules. While these are 
manmade creations, the distinction of being an original special 
jurisdiction belongs to the open ocean. Since there are no 
established digital trade zones from which to highlight, this 
Section returns to the sea in order to share by analogy how 
digital trade zones might be arranged. 
1. The Precedent of Pirate Radio 
In response to content restrictions imposed by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, disc jockeys and music promoters 
started what was known as pirate radio and began to pipe rock n’ 
roll music into Great Britain from vessels stationed in 
international waters.47 These vessels, and some old naval forts 
located outside British territorial waters that were used for 
broadcasting, were usually anchored to the seafloor and supplied 
by tenders from the mainland.48 In 1966, the most popular pirate 
broadcasters, Radio Caroline and Radio London, boasted an 
audience of over eight million listeners.49 And Britain was not 
alone; the Netherlands had its share of pirate stations as well.50 
At the time the pirate broadcasters were operating, 
controlling law was the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
 
 47 See Kimberley Peters, Taking More-Than-Human Geographies to Sea: Ocean 
Natures and Offshore Radio Piracy, in WATER WORLDS: HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE 
OCEAN 177, 178–80 (Jon Anderson & Kimberley Peters eds., 2014). 
 48 See id. at 182–83. 
 49 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting: A Test 
Case of the International System for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 75 (1982). 
 50 See id. at 76. 
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Seas.51 This agreement did not approve or prohibit an explicit 
right to broadcast from the high seas.52 In fact, the Convention 
only lists four core nautical freedoms: navigation, fishing, 
laying of pipelines and cables, and flight.53 Some argue that so 
long as broadcasting or any other activity did not interfere 
with any of these four freedoms, it would be permissible under 
the Convention.54 
Despite the apparent security offered under the Geneva 
Convention, pirate broadcasters were still targets of British and 
European authorities. To circumvent these authorities, the pirate 
broadcasters were known to fly a flag of convenience. These flags 
belonged to states that lacked the ability or will to hold pirate 
broadcasters accountable for their transmissions.55 Coastal 
countries, like Great Britain, could not exercise authority over 
pirate broadcasters flying flags of convenience because only the 
flag state possesses sole jurisdiction over its vessels.56 Early on, 
pirate radio learned the vital lesson that finding flags of 
convenience was necessary to avoid collapsing into the 
jurisdiction of the country which the pirates were attempting to 
avoid. Similarly, an embryonic digital trade zone—embodied in 
an oceangoing data center—would need to find a suitable flag of 
convenience to be able to exist apart from the onerous trade 
restrictions it seeks to evade. 
In an effort to punish pirate broadcasters, the 1965 
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts 
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories 
(“European Pirate Radio Agreement”) required “that signatory 
flag states punish pirate broadcasters found on their own 
ships.”57 The European Pirate Radio Agreement did not 
establish a new form of jurisdiction, however. Instead, it aimed 
to strengthen enforcement by targeting “acts of collaboration,” 
such as the provision or maintenance of the vessels, the 
provision of supplies to the broadcasters, and the provision of 
advertising to fund the pirate stations.58 Even though the 
vessels and transmitters were themselves beyond reach of 
 
 51 Id. at 79. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas]. 
 54 See Robertson, supra note 49, at 79. 
 55 See Robert C. F. Rueland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High 
Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1161, 1225 (1989). 
 56 See Swanson, supra note 5, at 739. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Robertson, supra note 49, at 95. 
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European governments, the network of logistical, financial, and 
human support for pirate radio was not. 
Pirate radio was effectively extinguished in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 
Article 109 gives states, even those who are not the flag states 
of a broadcasting vessel, power to arrest “any person or 
ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the 
broadcasting apparatus.”59 
Pirate radio represents an inchoate, primitive digital trade 
zone. Seeking to circumvent impediments to the flow of 
transmitted information, individuals took to the seas. In 
international waters, these pirate broadcasters were able to 
successfully carve out space and challenge state-owned radio 
corporations, much in the same way digital trade zones seek 
to challenge the protectionist impulses of data localization 
and cross-border data flow restrictions, but this time with 
state approval. 
2. The Legal Status of Oceanic Data Centers 
Pirate radio offers an instructive case study about the 
potential, as well as the limits, of using the ocean as a means of 
bypassing territorial laws limiting the flow of information. 
However, to understand the theory that gives purpose to digital 
trade zones, the pirate radio analogy must be improved by 
considering the effect of putting servers on the seas. Can 
territorial restrictions on the flow of information be circumvented 
by placing the data on a vessel in the ocean? 
For a time, Google pursued barge-based server farms that 
would deliver computing power throughout the world. In 2009, 
Google was granted a patent for a “water-based data center.”60 
Using the ocean to power and cool a data center could potentially 
mean operating the facility much more cheaply at sea than on 
land. While there are doubts about the technological feasibility of 
such server ships, it may nonetheless be possible for a data 
center to maintain a degree of independence from national 
Internet restrictions by remaining at sea.61 
 
 59 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. At present, the United States has signed but not ratified 
UNCLOS and treats parts of the agreement as customary international law. 
 60 U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009). 
 61 See Tim Worstall, Google’s Offshore Data Centres Won’t Be Out of the NSA’s Reach, 
Nor the US Government’s, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2013, 9:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2013/10/27/googles-offshore-data-centres-wont-be-out-of-the-nsas-reach-nor-
the-us-governments/#3e87c3787536 [http://perma.cc/6GGG-25VH]. 
Do Not Delete 4/24/2018 4:58 PM 
2018] Digital Trade Zones 455 
Such was the case when the Swedish website, Pirate Bay, 
attempted to purchase an old British naval fort located outside 
the country’s territorial waters in order to avoid law enforcement 
attempts to shut down the website.62 While this attempted 
acquisition was for nefarious purposes, it underscores the 
interest in, and potential of, efforts to find places where digital 
restrictions do not apply. The fort, known as Sealand, had been 
previously used as a pirate radio base and claims a modicum of 
sovereignty.63 Referred to as “a near-perfect embodiment of 
a data haven,” Sealand has already tested its independence 
in cyberspace by hosting HavenCo, a provider of online 
gambling services.64 
Building upon the lessons learned by pirate broadcasters and 
Sealanders alike, floating data centers would have to adhere to 
two important requirements at minimum. These vessels would 
have to remain on the high seas and would need to fly the flag of 
some nation. 
UNCLOS applies several degrees of territoriality to the 
ocean.65 Of these several degrees, only the finalthe high 
seasoffers sufficient freedom from the prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction of national governments to be of use in 
the intellectual development of digital trade zones. The high seas 
begin where a country’s exclusive economic zone ends; 200 miles 
from the shore.66 On the high seas, a state that is not the flag 
state of the vessel in question can exercise jurisdiction over a 
ship in international waters only in very limited circumstances 
such as if the ship is engaged in piracy or poses a specific threat 
to national security.67 One would hope that operating a cloud 
computing service at an offshore data center would not fall into 
 
 62 See Jan Libbenga, The Pirate Bay plans to buy Sealand, THE REGISTER 
(Jan. 12, 2007, 2:44 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/12/pirate_bay_buys_island/ 
[http://perma.cc/LHZ8-W3DY]. 
 63 See Kevin Fayle, Sealand Ho! Music Pirates, Data Havens, and the Future of 
International Copyright Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 261 (2005). Since it 
lacks the permanent population and capacity to pursue diplomatic relations, Sealand is 
unable to fully achieve sovereign recognition. Id. However, Sealand has been 
acknowledged to have a degree of sovereignty. Id. An English court found that Great 
Britain did not have jurisdiction over Sealand, and in 1978, the residents of Sealand lost 
the fort to German and Dutch nationals before they were able to recapture the fort in an 
air assault. Id. The Dutch and German invaders were then held as prisoners of war. Id.; 
see also Andrew H. E. Lyon, The Principality of Sealand, and Its Case for Sovereign 
Recognition, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 637, 642–43 (2015). 
 64 Fayle, supra note 63, at 262. 
 65 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea specifies these zones as internal 
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, the continental shelf, 
and the high seas. Swanson, supra note 5, at 727–38. 
 66 UNCLOS, supra note 59, at 40. 
 67 See id. at 53–54. 
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these categories, though countries such as China, which have 
highly restrictive Internet regimes, may argue otherwise. 
While the high seas offer a forum free from territorial data 
protectionism, a floating data center would also need, just like 
the pirate radio broadcasters of yore, to identify with a flag state 
in order to be protected against unwanted boarding and seizure. 
International law is explicit that a ship not flying the flag of a 
country is considered to be operating beyond the law.68 The flag 
state, to the contrary, enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel 
flying its flag, thus “[h]aving a nationality actually protects the 
ship from other states’ jurisdiction and lets the flag state exercise 
diplomatic protection over the vessel.”69 
Therefore, the operator of an oceangoing data center would 
want to select a flag state under which to operate the vessel. 
Options are not just limited to the United States or a company’s 
nation of incorporation, but also a host of nations offering their 
flags for sale. Countries offering flags of convenience include 
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.70 Organizations 
usually select flags of convenience because of the light-regulatory 
touch and low taxes found in these nations.71 However, in order 
to access markets with greater Internet regulatory schemes, 
especially when it comes to privacy, the operators of a floating 
data center may wish to choose a country that mimics the data 
protection regime of the jurisdiction within which they hope to 
conduct business. As such, operators of floating data centers may 
wish to affiliate with EU member states or Canada. 
3. Applicability to Digital Trade Zones 
The hypothetical treatment of data on the high seas offers 
two instructive lessons for digital trade zones. First, in order to 
be successful, a digital trade zone should attempt to mimic the 
legal conditions found on the high seas as much as possible. The 
digital trade zone should be a space free from territorial 
regulation on the flow of data; the digital trade zone should serve 
as a neutral zone separate and apart from domestic data 
restrictions. Just as it is for other special jurisdictions, 
extraterritoriality is important, and given the difficultly of 
operating data centers out in the ocean, replicating those legal 
conditions on land is core to the digital trade zones project. 
Second, digital trade zones still must be located somewhere in 
 
 68 See Sean Hickman, Flagging Options for Seasteading Projects, THE SEASTEADING 
INSTITUTE 3 (Mar. 2012). 
 69 Swanson, supra note 5, at 735–36. 
 70 Hickman, supra note 68, at 8. 
 71 Id. at 3. 
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order to benefit from a broader rule of law. This is similar to how 
a floating data center would need to select a flag state to avoid 
the predations attendant to being a stateless vessel on the high 
seas. Just as some flag states are more convenient for different 
operations, the United States likely offers the best conditions for 
digital trade zones, as it possesses a history of well-regarded 
privacy protection, a vibrant Internet industry, a strong rule of 
law, and a history of operating special jurisdictions. The 
advantages conferred on the first mover in this field would also 
be substantial, and policy makers may wish to work towards 
capturing these benefits. 
B. U.S. Foreign Trade Zones 
While the high seas offer an analogous way to think about 
the legal status of digital trade zones, FTZs in the United States 
offer direct insight into the mechanics of their digital trade 
counterparts. Created by the U.S. Congress in 1934, FTZs permit 
the occupants of the zone to defer customs duties and excise 
taxes on goods brought into the zone.72 FTZs have proven to be 
successful special jurisdictions in the United States and as such 
offer a template from which to model their digital cousins. 
1. The Purpose of Foreign Trade Zones 
The purpose of FTZs is to prove an incentive for siting 
certain manufacturing functions within the United States. FTZs 
promote “importation for the purpose of conditioning or 
combining foreign goods with domestic products prior to 
exporting the finished products to foreign markets, rather than 
retaining them for domestic consumption.”73 At present, most 
activity in FTZs is manufacturing. Since their creation, the 
number of FTZs has proliferated. Before 1970, there were only 
ten cities with zones.74 Today, there are over 200 approved 
zones.75 Domestic inputs into zones account for fifty-eight 
percent of inputs while forty-two percent of inputs come from 
foreign sources.76 
 
 72 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (2012). 
 73 Barbara M. Sheppard, Foreign Trade Zones – International Business Incentives, 7 
GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 669, 670 (1977). 
 74 See John J. DaPonte, Jr., The Foreign Trade Zones Act: Keeping Up with the 
Changing Times, BUS. AM., Dec. 1997, at 22.  
 75 See US Foreign Trade Zones, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.export.gov/ 
article?id=US-Foreign-Trade-Zones [http://perma.cc/MR9K-8G4Z]. 
 76 MARY JANE BOLLE & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42686, U.S. 
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2013). 
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2. The Structure of Foreign Trade Zones 
The most unique factor of FTZs is that they exist outside of 
U.S customs territory.77 This allows FTZs to offer duty deferral 
on goods entering the zones. Customs duties are only paid when 
the imported goods are actually transported into U.S. customs 
territory.78 In this way, FTZs represent more of a “procedure” 
than an actual physical demarcated place.79 While all the zones 
are exempt from the same customs procedures, the zones are 
hardly homogenous, ranging from large, sprawling facilities to 
single warehouses.80 
Applications for FTZs are reviewed by the Foreign Trade 
Zones Board. Located within the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
the Board is made up of the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Secretary of the Treasury.81 The Board has an Executive Secretary 
to lead the daily operations.82 The Board examines and, where 
appropriate, approves applications for new FTZ designations and 
then grants the designation to local governments or non-profit 
corporations, which then create and maintain the zone as a public 
utility.83 Customs and Border Protection oversees all activities and 
collects all revenues from FTZs.84 
3. Foreign Trade Zones Meet Digital Trade Zones 
FTZs offer an established model for digital trade zones. 
Proposed digital trade zones in the United States would be 
established via federal legislation, and organizations would 
petition a Digital Trade Zones Board—perhaps also including the 
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury as 
leaders—for inclusion in the program. Digital trade zones would 
be areas where instead of deferring duty collection, the United 
States would forbear from various Internet and privacy-related 
jurisdictions providing participating organizations the ability to 
self-regulate in ways that would satisfy the requirements of 
international data markets. Thus, digital trade zones would, 
similar to their foreign trade progenitors, be procedures rather 
than standard physical locations. Digital trade zones could 
be permitted to take a variety of forms and sizes; from the 
 
 77 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial 
Charters, to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 982 (2016). 
 78 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 11. 
 79 DaPonte, supra note 74, at 206. 
 80 Sheppard, supra note 73, at 670. 
 81 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 13. 
 82 See NAT’L ASS’N OF FOREIGN TRADE ZONES, THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 
PROGRAM – PROMOTING TRADE, JOB CREATION & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2013). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. 
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largest of data centers to the most unusual of Internet 
communication arrangements. 
III. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN PRACTICE 
While there may be other applications of digital trade zones, 
and their enacting legislation should anticipate and encourage 
alternative uses, this article contemplates two practical uses. 
These two applications consider digital trade zones as 
experiments and digital trade zones as waystations. Both types of 
zones would adhere to the general procedures and structures in 
Part II. By permitting a country, in this analysis the United 
States, to forbear from jurisdiction over a defined area for the 
purposes of establishing law governing the Internet or other data 
uses unique to the zone, both experimental and transitory zones 
would be able to bypass restrictions on cross-border data flows 
and data localization requirements. 
A. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments 
Digital trade zones could also be used to detour around 
restrictions on cross-border data flows. This could be done by 
creating zones where companies could participate in different 
experimental arrangements designed to safeguard consumer 
privacy and work towards developing more beneficial 
arrangements for the transfer of data across borders. 
Digital trade zones as experimental areas are perhaps most 
applicable to the relationship between the United States and the 
EU. In 2012, U.S. digital exports to the EU were worth $140.6 
billion, representing seventy-two percent of all services exports to 
the EU.85 Total U.S.–EU trade in goods and services totaled $1 
trillion, and U.S. foreign direct investment in the EU amounted 
to $2.4 trillionfifty-six percent of total U.S. direct investment 
worldwide.86 There are several ways in which the flow of data 
across the Atlantic creates such exceptional value. For instance, 
many businesses in Europe sell products to and engage 
customers in the United States, European firms receive 
investment advice from U.S. consultancies, and companies share 
data internally from their international subsidiaries.87 This is 
similar to how Boeing tracks engine operating data throughout 
 
 85 Joshua P. Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic Data Flows 
for U.S. and EU Trade and Investment 12 (Brookings Inst. Glob. Econ. & Dev., Working 
Paper No. 79, 2014). 
 86 See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU 
DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (2016). 
 87 See Meltzer, supra note 85, at 8. 
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the world and shares it through its company and with 
commercial airlines. 
1. Attempts to Preserve U.S.–EU Cross-Border Data Flows 
Despite the incredible amount of data driven commerce 
between the United States and the EU, the EU’s exceptionally 
rigorous data privacy requirements has been a thorn in the side 
of U.S.–EU trade relations when it comes to cross-border data 
flows. In October 1995, the EU adopted the Data Protection 
Directive (“DPD”) to create a unified, comprehensive framework 
for data protection.88 The DPD mandates that data on EU 
citizens can only leave the EU (and DPD’s protections) if the 
destination jurisdiction has a sufficient data protection regime.89 
The EU assesses how adequate foreign data protections are by 
reviewing the circumstances governing the transfer of data.90 
This initially posed problems for the United States, which 
lacks the same kind of comprehensive data protection law. 
Consumer privacy protection laws in the United States are 
“industry specific and vary by sector, with different laws 
governing the collection and disclosure of financial data, 
health-related data, student information, and motor vehicle 
records.”91 Some commentators have noted that, while less 
comprehensive on the whole, the alleged patchwork protections 
found in the United States form a much more nimble and flexible 
response to consumer privacy than the European approach, a 
view shared by the Department of Commerce, which maintains 
that “[t]he sum of the parts of U.S. privacy protection is equal to 
or greater than the single whole of Europe.”92 
Despite these reassurances, and in order to maintain 
transatlantic data flows, the U.S. and the EU agreed to the Safe 
Harbor Agreement in 2000.93 The Safe Harbor Agreement was 
the result of negotiations between both sides in order to find an 
 
 88 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 
95/46/EC]. 
 89 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 2.  
 90 Id. The EU also focuses on “the nature of the data, the purpose and direction of 
the proposed processing operations, the countries of origin, and the final destination of 
the data, and that country’s laws, rules, and security measures.” Id.; see also Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 88, at arts. 25–26. 
 91 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 3. 
 92 Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-laws-an-
ocean-apart.html. 
 93 See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK; A GUIDE TO SELF-
CERTIFICATION 3 (2009). 
Do Not Delete 4/24/2018 4:58 PM 
2018] Digital Trade Zones 461 
arrangement that satisfied the “adequate level of protection” for 
data mandated by the DPD.94 At its peak, about 4500 U.S. 
companies participated in the framework established by the Safe 
Harbor Agreement. Participation was open to any U.S. 
organization that was regulated by the Federal Trade 
Commission and, separately, airlines, even though they are 
regulated by the Department of Transportation. This restriction 
did limit the Safe Harbor Agreement to these regulated 
industries and notably, it did not include U.S. financial or 
telecommunications companies.95 
The serenity found under the Safe Harbor Agreement was 
dashed when in October 2015, the European Court of Justice 
struck down Safe Harbor Agreement as insufficient under the 
DPD.96 First, the court found that a European Commission 
finding that a foreign country—the United States—had sufficient 
privacy protections does not supersede and reduce the powers of 
EU authorities to assess data privacy protections.97 The 
European Court of Justice also determined that because the 
European Commission did not investigate “the domestic laws or 
international commitment of a third country prior to making a 
determination on the adequacy of their data privacy protection,” 
the Commission decision adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement 
was invalid.98 
The bombshell decision was followed by the U.S. and the EU 
scrambling to find a new mechanism to protect privacy and then 
facilitate transatlantic movement of data as quickly as possible. 
In February 2016, the U.S. and the EU announced a replacement 
to the Safe Harbor Agreement: the Privacy Shield Framework.99 
The Privacy Shield Framework is meant to be a more robust 
version of the Safe Harbor Agreement. The Privacy Shield 
Framework is characterized by several changes, including 
stronger enforcement measures administered by the Department 
of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, improved 
redress for citizens who believe their data has been compromised, 
and greater commitments by participating U.S. companies, such 
as more detailed notice obligations, prescriptive access rights, 
 
 94 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 5. 
 95 Id. at 6. 
 96 See Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the 
EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J. 
DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2–3). 
 97 See Mira Burri & Rahel Schar, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: 
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 6 J. INFO. 
POL’Y 479, 486 (2016). 
 98 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 7. 
 99 Id. at 9. 
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and data retention limits.100 Currently, 2500 organizations 
participate in the Privacy Shield Framework.101 
In October 2017, the European Commission released a report 
announcing that the Privacy Shield Framework continues to 
provide sufficient protection under EU law.102 However, this 
positive development should not obfuscate concerns that the 
Privacy Shield Framework, like the Safe Harbor Agreement 
before it, will be eternal. Even at its inception, the EU recognized 
“shortcomings” with the framework,103 and with the DPD’s 
forthcoming replacement by the General Data Privacy Directive 
(“GDPD”) in 2018, questions may once again arise about the 
survival of data flow arrangements between the U.S. and the 
EU.104 The GDPD has a somewhat more expansive scope 
than the DPD—particularly when it comes to territoriality, 
data-subject rights, and personal data processing, to name a 
fewwhich may mean the currently accepted Privacy Shield 
Framework protections will be suddenly out of date when the 
GDPD comes into force next year.105 And even without this 
worry, litigation relating to another tool available for U.S. 
business compliance with the DPD—standard contractual 
clauses—has been unceasing since the invalidation of the Safe 
Harbor Agreement. Given that this litigation, centered on the 
acceptability and protective adequacy of the standard contractual 
clauses will continue regardless of the GDPD issue, the Privacy 
Shield Framework will continue to face active threats and 
challenges for the foreseeable future.106 
 
 100 The Judicial Redress Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2015), which was signed into law by 
President Obama in February 2016, improved transatlantic trust regarding data flows. 
Broadly, the Act aims to include citizens of foreign countries or organizations (like the 
EU), which the United States has an agreement with to promote privacy protections. 
Similar to the promise offered by digital trade zones, passage of the Judicial Redress Act 
was hailed as a turning point in U.S.–EU data relations. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra 
note 86, at 10, 13. 
 101 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross 
Welcomes Release of European Commission Report on EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur- 
ross-welcomes-release-european-commissions [http://perma.cc/Z7NZ-PLFB]. 
 102 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
First Annual Review of the Functioning of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield, at 2, COM (2017), 
611 final (Oct. 18, 2017). 
 103 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 11. 
 104 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data 
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221, 
222 (2017). 
 105 Id. at 222, 225. 
 106 See Catherine Muyl, EU Updates on Schrems II and the Privacy Shield, SECURITY, 
PRIVACY AND THE LAW (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2017/ 
10/eu-updates-on-schrems-ii-and-the-privacy-shield/ [http://perma.cc/LCU6-BC4L]. There 
is also litigation in France challenging the Privacy Shield Framework. See Les Exégètes 
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2. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments 
The tense history, and continued fragility, of U.S.–EU data 
privacy agreements offers an opportunity for proposed digital 
trade zones to shine. While digital trade zones could be viewed as 
experimental zones in a variety of ways, this article focuses on 
one prominent way in which digital trade zones could be valuable 
areas of trade innovation. Currently, any data privacy 
arrangement between the U.S. and the EU has to be negotiated 
in great detail and would apply to the entirety of both 
jurisdictions. The stakes are also exceptionally high; a single 
agreement must be, at least at the time of its adoption, near 
perfect, or face invalidation.107 And even where an agreement is 
successful at fending off legal challenges, these challenges still 
undermine the agreement’s stability until resolution, potentially 
forestalling quick adoption of the framework. 
Digital trade zones could be designed to permit organizations 
to experiment with different data privacy arrangements. The 
United States could forbear from standard privacy laws in 
specified zones. The governing principle in the zones would be a 
hybrid privacy regime: U.S. law contextualized by EU 
requirements. This would allow several places to experiment 
with data privacy arrangements. There are three benefits to 
using digital trade zones to experiment with privacy 
arrangements in order to circumvent impediments to the 
international flow of data. One way this might function would be 
if parties, such as the U.S. and EU, negotiated a variety of data 
privacy arrangements and then specified specific zones in which 
the arrangements would apply. Much like FTZs, these digital 
trade zones would be limited to the geographic area around 
single companies or server complexes. Interested organizations 
would be able to apply to the Department of Commerce to be the 
guinea pigs for different privacy arrangements. For participating 
companies, the benefits would be clear: access to European 
markets that would otherwise be beyond reach. Just as 
companies apply to participate in the FTZ program because it 
gives them more efficient and less costly access to difficult to 
source inputs, companies handling big data would be motivated 
to participate in a digital trade zone by the inverse: access to 
difficult to reach overseas markets. 
 
Amatuers, Privacy Shield, LES EXÉGÈTES AMATEURS (2016), https://exegetes.eu.org/ 
dossiers/privacyshield/index.html [http://perma.cc/W324-QP7H]. 
 107 See Graham Greenleaf, International Data Privacy Agreements after the GDPR 
and Schrems, 139 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 6, 8 (noting that a less than perfect 
Privacy Shield Framework invites litigation designed to destroy the agreement). 
Do Not Delete 4/24/2018 4:58 PM 
464 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2 
There are three benefits to using digital trade zones to 
experiment with privacy arrangements in order to circumvent 
impediments to the international flow of data. 
First, experimental digital trade zones would reduce the 
currently high stakes of every data protection agreement 
negotiation. Since the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Privacy 
Shield Framework apply to the entire United States, companies 
do not have a choice of participating in some other arrangement. 
This means that the stakes are exceptionally high during a 
negotiation over a new arrangement or when considering 
updating an arrangement. If there were numerous arrangements 
in place, any of which could be applied for and to specific local 
jurisdictions, the stakes would be lower for each individual 
agreement. The U.S. and the EU might be more willing to 
experiment with different types of arrangements, perhaps even 
limiting the initial number of organizations which could 
participate during pilot programs, and would be more likely to 
approach agreements in an iterative process, adopting lessons 
learned from test agreements and adjusting to developments in 
U.S. and EU privacy law. 
Relatedly, these zones could act as fail safes in the event 
certain regimes were invalidated. With lower stakes and more 
experimental agreements spread over different jurisdictions, the 
numerousness of digital trade zones would guarantee that if a 
single arrangement was invalidated by a U.S. or EU court, other 
agreements would still be in place. Indeed, if digital trade zones 
are permitted to “stack” agreements, conforming to the most 
stringent aspects of every agreement, even where one of the 
jurisdiction’s agreements is invalidated, the jurisdiction is still 
able to function under other agreements. Consider the creative 
commons license system. Just as licensors are able to select 
different types of licenses that give them the desired level of 
attribution, commercial reuse, and derivativeness, organizations 
operating in a digital trade zone would be able to select the data 
privacy and legal arrangements that best suit their organization 
and the market access it hopes to achieve.108 Modularity means 
longevity for transatlantic data agreements. The dispersed 
nature of the zones’ agreement frameworks would no longer 
necessitate hurried negotiation for global replacements where a 
prior regime is withdrawn. Even without an agreement stack, 
there would already be other types of model agreements in place 
 
 108 See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
[http://perma.cc/87JF-EMJP] (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
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that the parties could draw upon to replace a failed or 
invalidated experimental arrangement. 
Third, digital trade zones would inject market forces into a 
currently bulky, and non-market process. By marketizing data 
privacy arrangements, digital trade zones would be more 
responsive to consumers while giving greater choice to policy 
makers. Right now, consumers can only choose to do U.S.–EU 
business with companies complying with the Privacy Shield 
Framework. Consumers are not able to choose amongst 
companies that might protect their privacy even better under an 
experimental arrangement, and companies are not efficiently 
incentivized to offer greater or lesser, but more targeted, 
protections. Given the privacy concerns that form the basis of 
many people’s desire to remain offline or minimize their online 
presence, this consumer choice is critical.109 Businesses will also 
be interested in such a proposal because it offers a chance to 
improve their reputations vis a vis consumers’ privacy desires, 
likely in a certification-style manner.110 In this way digital trade 
zones can help organizations seeking to operate in Europe, while 
also giving consumers a voice in what types of data privacy 
arrangements they prefer. 
B. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations 
While data localization policies are difficult to surmount 
because the policies are designed to prohibit the international 
movement of data entirely, digital trade zones can still offer an 
answer to data localization problems when used as waystations. 
These types of digital trade zones would exist to hold data in 
transition and would be aimed at addressing localization 
initiatives, such as those found in Canada. 
1. Data Localization in Canada 
As mentioned previously, the Canadian provinces of British 
Columbia and Nova Scotia both have serious localization 
requirements for public data. Both provinces require that 
personal information held by a public organization, such as a 
university, hospital, school, or public department, be held in 
Canada.111 Moreover, these public entities are prohibited from 
using U.S.–based services if there is the chance the data 
 
 109 See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and 
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. 
INT’L. L. 1, 37 (2000). 
 110 See id. at 35–36. 
 111 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72. 
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covered by the laws could be “stored in or accessed from the 
United States.”112 
British Columbia’s localization requirement comes from the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”), 
an act governing the protection of public information.113 Section 
30.1 of FIPPA mandates that “a public body must ensure that 
personal information in its custody or under its control is 
stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”114 There 
are three exceptions: (1) if the individual consents to their 
information being stored in or accessed from another 
jurisdiction; (2) if the data is stored in or accessed from another 
jurisdiction “for the purpose of disclosure allowed under this 
Act”; and (3) if the information was disclosed in order make a 
payment or resolve an issue surrounding a payment to “the 
government of British Columbia or a public body.”115 “Under 
FIPPA, a ‘record’ includes books, documents, maps, drawings, 
photographs, letters, vouchers, papers and any other thing on 
which information is recorded or stored by graphic, electronic, 
mechanical or other means.”116 
In Nova Scotia, the Personal Information International 
Disclosure Protection Act (“PIIDPA”) forms the core of the 
province’s localization requirement, since PIIDPA focuses on the 
unauthorized disclosure of information specifically beyond 
Canada and makes it illegal for information to be stored in, or 
accessed from, jurisdictions outside of Canada. There are 
exceptions, instances of which are detailed in a report issued by 
the government of Nova Scotia.117 For example, energy officials in 
Nova Scotia permitted twenty-four staffers to use their 
government email while traveling abroad to places like the 
United States, Norway, and China.118 The explanation provided 
for this exemption from PIIDPA is innocuous and standard: “staff 
may be required to monitor their email and voicemail for 
business continuity purposes.”119 Almost all the other entries in 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 OFFICE OF THE INFO. & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR B.C., GUIDE TO ACCESS AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTION UNDER FIPPA 3 (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter FIPPA GUIDE]. 
 114 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 165 R.S.B.C. § 30.1 (1996). 
 115 165 R.S.B.C. §§ 30.1, 33.1(1). 
 116 FIPPA GUIDE, supra note 113, at 7. 
 117 See Ian Wallace, Privacy: what laws apply in Atlantic Canada?, STEWART MCKELVEY, 
http://www.smss.com/abcnewsletter/AEC/2014_Summer/A1.html [http://perma.cc/ML8K-MGG8] 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
 118 N.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE 
PROTECTION ACT: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (July 2015). 
 119 Id. 
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the report detail similar situations of staff bringing laptops and 
phones outside of Canada on official or personal trips.120 
2. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations 
In this conception of digital trade zones, waystations are 
locations where data is transitory. Information will flow through 
the zone but not be accessed there. Data may be stored there as 
long as necessary until it is repatriated back to the jurisdiction 
with the localization requirement. The waystation model would 
work by creating space where organizations would be permitted 
to add additional privacy and cybersecurity protections to meet 
the protection thresholds necessary to handle the data coming 
out of a localized jurisdiction. However, the waystation would not 
be physically located in that jurisdiction and may even be 
situated in a foreign country. 
In the case of Canada, the United States could create digital 
trade zones that exist as spaces outside of U.S. jurisdiction for 
the purposes of privacy laws, similar to how FTZs exist “outside” 
the U.S. for the purposes of duty collection on initial imports. In 
these zones, organizations would be able to build and operate 
servers to handle public data from British Columbia or Nova 
Scotia. Since the zones would be outside the jurisdiction of the 
United States for the purposes of privacy law, the zones would be 
able to be sealed from intrusion by host jurisdiction surveillance 
agencies. Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
also known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), would 
not apply. Law enforcement would not be able to use a warrant 
issued under the SCA to access data stored outside the United 
States.121 The individual whose data is being stored remains 
inviolate because the organization storing the individual’s 
information is merely a “caretaker.”122 The right to the data 
remains with the individual, in this case in Canada, and the 
server itself remains in the digital trade zone thus technically 
outside the borders of the United States. With ensured privacy 
protection from the United States, organizations operating in the 
zone would still need to certify to the relevant province that they 
had met the necessary privacy and cyber protection to handle the 
province’s public data. Furthermore, the data would not be able 
to be accessed in these zones. It would simply be stored there 
 
 120 See generally id. 
 121 In re Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and 
Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
 122 Andrew J. Pecoraro, Drawing Lines in the Cloud: Implications of Extraterritorial 
Limits to the Stored Communications Act, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 75, 95 (2017). 
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until the data was requested back in Canada, at which point it 
would be transmitted back to the originating province. 
The benefit of the waystation model is that it may be easier, 
more cost-effective, and less burdensome to construct, maintain, 
and operate a collection of servers in jurisdictions that are not 
subject to the localization requirement. In the U.S.–Canada 
example, it may be easier to build and operate servers in the 
United States, or another country, than it is in Nova Scotia. 
For example, in Toronto it costs $1580 per square meter to 
build a high-tech factory, the closest type of structure to a data 
center mentioned in a recent report on comparative construction 
costs.123 Presumably it may be even more expensive to do such 
construction in places outside of Canada’s largest city, such as 
Nova Scotia. While all U.S. cities in the report were listed as 
having higher construction costs than Toronto, numerous other 
cities did have lower costs, potentially making them ripe 
candidates for using digital trade zones as waystations. Some 
notable cities where construction costs are lower than Toronto 
include Seoul, Singapore, and Brisbane.124 However, data centers 
are different from generic high-tech factories, and so these 
general numbers might not encompass the exact cost of 
construction for such a specialized facility. In the United States, 
it costs on average $43 million to build a data center.125 Costs are 
even higher in Brazil ($60.9 million) and Chile ($51.2 million).126 
Directly comparable data was not available for Canada. However, 
data center construction costs in Brazil and Chile were higher 
than the United States, even though construction of high-tech 
factories in both of those countries were considerably cheaper 
than such construction in the United States.127 This suggests 
that there is something intrinsic about the construction of data 
centers that makes such construction cheaper in the United 
States than abroad. To the extent that such construction is 
cheaper in the United States rather than British Columbia 
or Nova Scotia, digital trade zones can serve as a way to 
promote the domestic construction industry, while also 
 
 123 TURNER & TOWNSEND, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKET SURVEY 2016, at 
26 (2016) (comparing construction costs on numerous global cities—Toronto was the only 
Canadian city included and U.S. cities covered by the report were New York City, 
Houston, San Francisco, and Seattle). 
 124 See id. at 13. 
 125 Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 36.  
 126 Id. 
 127 See TURNER & TOWNSEND, supra note 123, at 24, 28, 78. Construction costs for a 
high-tech factory was $1300 in Brazil and $3500 in Chile. Id. at 24, 28. Comparatively, 
according to the report, the city with the lowest cost of construction of a high-tech factory 
was Houston at $4272. Id. at 78. 
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bringing U.S. organizations in closer proximity to Canadian 
information markets. 
Construction is not the only driving cost of data centers. 
Data centers are exceptionally energy intensive,128 with energy 
costs accounting for three-quarters of a data center’s cost of 
operation.129 In Canada, data centers use approximately one 
percent of the entirety of the country’s energy consumption.130 
And, since Canada actually has more expensive electricity than 
the United States, small businesses pay, on average, eight 
percent more and industrial businesses pay thirty percent more 
per kilowatt hour than their southern neighbors.131 Cheap 
electricity in the United States may be a reason why businesses 
would want to site their data centers in the United States rather 
than in Canada. While Canada has 164 data centers, the costs of 
operating those centers can be reduced by siting those centers in 
the U.S., or by contracting with U.S.–based centers to handle 
provincial public information.132 Waystation digital trade zones 
would help enable this cross-border data storing to be realized. 
C. Digital Trade Zones and Intellectual Property Rights 
The practical proposals of digital trade zones as experiments 
and waystations only addresses two of the three main types of 
digital trade barriers. Digital trade zones could also help advance 
national interests in protecting intellectual property. While the 
potential for digital trade zones to seriously mitigate intellectual 
property rights infringement is reserved for future works, it is 
worthwhile to mention one particular way that digital trade 
zones guard against intellectual property rights infringement, 
even only examining the simple applications presented in the 
present work. 
The Trade Related Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) 
Agreement, which was created along with the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) at the Uruguay Round, requires 
participating states to establish minimum intellectual property 
rights standards.133 However, some view the TRIPS Agreement 
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International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2011). 
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minimum standards as insufficient. For example, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires that countries make available “enforcement 
procedures” against intellectual property rights violations.134 
This language stops short of any “affirmative obligation to stop 
acts of infringement.”135 This suggests that digital trade zones 
may be able to fill gaps in the TRIPS Agreement by denying 
violators an opportunity to purloin intellectual property. 
One example from a country mentioned in this article is 
Canada. Canada remains on the U.S. Trade Representative’s 
Special 301 Watch List for a variety of reasons.136 Canada does 
not give customs officials authority to “detain, seize, and destroy 
pirated and counterfeit goods.”137 Presumably, this limitation 
could be extended to goods in digital form, although there 
remains a debate about the proper classification of e-products 
under the WTO.138 As digitally neutral territory that retain (or 
even improve upon) the intellectual property rights regimes of 
their host country, digital trade zones offer safe havens for digital 
content to be stored without fear of piracy. While the data may be 
subject to piracy if it moves across borders and outside the digital 
trade zone, digital trade zones can offer intellectual property 
protection for the data they hold. 
CONCLUSION 
In a world with non-tariff restrictions on trade, there is a 
truism that speaks to those who desire to negotiate around 
these restrictions: to play the game, participants must 
give something up. That is, to engage in commerce across borders, 
participants—whether they be countries or organizations—must 
be prepared to find some compromise. In the context of digital 
trade zones this thinking also holds true. Countries seeking to 
expand their digital markets might forbear from some jurisdiction 
over their territory, internet laws, and surveillance authority in 
order to promote the creation of digital trade zones and the 
proliferation of e-commerce by domestic organizations. Countries 
seeking to protect their domestic technology sectors should also be 
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prepared to give up some of the artificial advantage created by 
protectionist policies. Privacy remains protected at the level 
required by the home jurisdiction and data-based commerce flows 
more easily in a trusted environment in the host jurisdiction. 
This article has provided some initial thoughts to start a 
conversation on digital trade zones; many additional inquiries on 
this topic and opportunities for exploration yet exist. A further 
investigation of the ways in which digital trade zones could 
protect intellectual property rights, especially as data flows 
through jurisdictions that do not contain digital trade zones, is 
vital. It would also be worthwhile to consider what digital trade 
zones might look like in other, non-common law countries. This 
article proposed a particular conception of digital trade zones 
based off of international maritime law blended with the 
procedures of FTZs in the United States. Given the expansiveness 
of special jurisdictions throughout the world, what other types of 
special jurisdictions could serve as models to improve the 
usefulness of digital trade zones or tailor them to even more 
specific applications of situations? And is there a different base 
framework better suited to the general foundation of the digital 
trade zone? 
While digital trade zones may never be deployed in the real 
world, the underlying principles which would motivate their 
consideration and adoption is worth noting. The forbearance of 
jurisdiction that would be required to occur in digital trade 
zones represents an inherently pro-commerce approach. Where 
governments can be persuaded to forbear from protectionist 
policies generally, and limit other impeding regulations in certain 
narrow cases or jurisdictions, private industry, organizations, and 
entrepreneurs can leverage this freedom to create value for the 
communities in which they are based. 
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